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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
TIMOTHY NOBLE WALKER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20150317-CA 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e). See Addendum A 
(Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee defendants the right to a 
jury determination of guilt on every element of the offense. The jury convicted Walker of 
aggravated assault, which required a finding that he used force likely to cause serious 
bodily injury. The State's evidence was that Walker put his wife in a chokehold and she 
briefly lost consciousness. Instruction 18 said that "strangulation to the point of 
unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury." Did Instruction 18 violate the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments by taking an element away from the jury? 
Standard of Review and Preservation: "A challenge to the trial court's jury 
instructions presents a question oflaw that [this Court will] review for correctness, 
granting no deference to the trial court's conclusions." State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, 
iJ6, 155 P.3d 909. This issue is preserved by defense counsel's objection to Instruction 
18. See R.109 (Instruction 18) (Addendum B); 162: 1-6 ( counsel objects to Instruction 
18); 162:21 (court's order) (Addendum C); 162:187 (court reads Instruction 18 to jury). 
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following are in Addendum D: Utah Code §§76-1-601 (2012); 76-
5-102 (2012); 76-5-103 (2012); U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE 
a. Procedural History. 
The State charged Walker with one count of aggravated assault, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code §76-5-103(2)(b). R.1-2. The charge required the State 
to prove, among other elements, that (1) Walker used "means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury" and (2) the assault "result[ed] in serious bodily injury." 
Utah Code §76-5-103(l)(b)(ii), (2)(b); see R.1-2. Walker pleaded not guilty. R.30-31. 
Before trial, both parties filed notice of intent to call an expert on strangulation. 
R.35-36; 81-82. The State also proposed this jury instruction: "You are instructed that 
strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury." R.65; 78. 
At trial, Walker objected to the State's proposed instruction. R.162:1-6. Following 
argument, the court decided to give the instruction. R.162:21. Thereafter, Walker called 
an expert to testify about strangulation injuries, but the State did not. R.162. 
At the end of trial, the court instructed the jury. R.91-116. The State's proposed 
instruction was given as Instruction 18. R.109. The court also instructed the jury on two 
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lesser-included offenses: aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and assault, a class B 
misdemeanor. R.112-13. As instructed, Walker was guilty of aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony, ifhe "[u]sed force or means likely to cause death or serious bodily injury." 
R.112. He was guilty of assault if he"[ c Jaus[ ed] bodily injury ... or creat[ ed] a 
substantial risk of causing bodily injury." R.113. The jury found Walker guilty of the 
lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. R.87-88. 
On April 6, 2015, the trial court sentenced Walker to zero-to-five years in prison, 
suspended the prison sentence, and placed Walker on 48 months of probation. R.145-46; 
166:17-20. Thereafter, the court granted Walker's motion to review sentence and request 
for prison commitment and imposed the zero-to-five year prison commitment. R.142-44; 
147; 150-51; 167. Walker filed a timely notice of appeal. R.152-53. 
b. The Trial Evidence. 
The State called Ann Hilton, Hilton's son Anthony, and the responding officer, 
Jarom Fano, to testify. R.162. The State did not call an expert on strangulation injuries. 
R.162. The defense called the responding paramedic, Edward Godnick; Walker's sister, 
Lisa Walker Hopkins; and Dr. Robert Rothfeder, an expert on strangulation injuries. 
R.162. The witnesses testified as follows. 
Walker and Hilton lived in South Carolina. R.162: 102. They began dating in 
September 2013 and married less than a month later. R.162:103. Shortly after that, 
Hilton's employer transferred her to Utah. R.162: 102. Walker, Hilton, and Anthony 
packed up and moved to Utah, arriving on January 12 or 13, 2014. R.162:102-03. The 
three moved into a hotel room until they could find a place to live. R.162:104. 
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Walker and Hilton routinely drank in the evenings. R.162:92-93, 118. According 
to Anthony, Walker and Hilton drank to intoxication several nights a week. R.162:92-93. 
On the evening of January 15, Walker and Hilton were drinking in the hotel room. 
R.162:92, 106-07. The testimony about the amount they had to drink was inconsistent. At 
trial, Hilton testified that she and Walker had two to three drinks, R.162: 106-07, and 
Anthony testified that Walker and Hilton had drunk a "moderate amount" and might have 
been intoxicated. R.162:76, 92. At the preliminary hearing, Hilton testified that she and 
Walker had been drinking for "two to three hours," R.162: 117, and Anthony testified that 
Walker and Hilton were intoxicated. R.162:92. 
As Hilton and Walker drank, Walker lay on the bed and Hilton walked around the 
room. R.162:76. They "were both talking," "going in and out between fighting and 
talking calmly." R.162:76. At one point, Walker got up, fixed a drink, got back in bed, 
and put the drink on the nightstand. R.162:76, 93. Hilton took the drink and put it in the 
freezer. R.162:76-77, 93. Walker retrieved the drink from the freezer and put it back on 
the nightstand. R.162:76, 93. Hilton took the drink again and poured it down the sink. 
R.162:76, 93-94. At that point, Walker got up and hit Hilton. R.162:76-77, 107-09. 
The testimony about how Walker hit Hilton was inconsistent. Hilton and Anthony 
testified that Walker used a fist. R.162:76-77, 108. But Hilton acknowledged that she 
could not recall whether Walker used a fist.R.162:118-19. She also acknowledged telling 
an officer at the scene that Walker "slapped" her. R.162: 119-21, 130. 
After hitting Hilton, Walker returned to bed, and, according to Anthony, Hilton lit 
a cigarette. R.162:78, 90-91. Hilton denied smoking in the hotel room. R.162:123. 
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Hilton then began searching Walker's clothes for the van keys. R.162:78-79. She 
found the keys and put them in her pocket. R.162:78-79. As she did, Walker came up to 
her from behind, wrapped his right wrist around her neck, and lifted her "onto her tippy 
toes" as he reached for the van keys with his left hand. R.162:79-81, 110-11. 
Anthony testified that when Walker could not reach the keys, he used his left hand 
to reinforce his right wrist and lifted Hilton off the floor. R.162:79-81, 96. According to 
Anthony, Hilton dropped the cigarette and struggled to loosen Walker's grip. R.162:84, 
89. Then, after IO to 15 seconds, Hilton "exhaled quite loudly and her eyes like rolled 
back in her head and she went limp." R.162:84-85, 111. 
About a second later, Walker pushed Hilton away, said that Hilton "was faking it," 
gathered his belongings, left the hotel room, and did not return. R.162:86-88. According 
to Anthony, Hilton "fell against the wall with her face and just sat there." R.162:86. 
Hilton woke up "[p]robably about a minute" later. R.162:88, 111. Anthony called the 
police. R.162:88. 
Officer Fano responded to Anthony's call. R.162: 135. Fano attempted to talk with 
Hilton, but "she didn't appear that she was in the right state of mind." R.162:112, 136. 
She told him that she "didn't remember what happened." R.162:112, 136. She said that 
"the only thing she remembered was pouring ou[t] Mr. Walker's drink." R.162: 142. 
Fano noticed "fresh marks on [Hilton's] right eye." R.162:136. He also noticed 
"red marks" around Hilton's neck, which "appeared to be swollen." R.162:139. Fano 
"called for medical to have them respond to evaluate" Hilton. R.162: 136. The paramedic 
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examined Hilton for about 10 minutes. R.162: 148. He noted that Hilton had "no apparent 
injuries." R.162: 149. Hilton declined his offer to go to the hospital. R.162: 114. 
At trial, Hilton testified that she suffered a concussion and headaches from the 
incident. R.162:127-28. Ten days after the incident, however, she went to the hospital for 
pain in her face and neck and an unrelated thumb injury. R.162:125-26, 130-31; Defense 
Exh. 1. The medical report noted "mild" swelling around the eye and "mild" muscle 
tenderness in the neck, but it did not mention a concussion or headaches. R.162:127-28, 
131; Defense Exh. 1. Hilton did not seek any other medical treatment for injuries related 
to the incident. R.162: 132. 
Dr. Rothfeder, an expert on strangulation injuries, testified that strangulation may 
occur through a ligature, such as a rope or wire, or through "manual mechanisms," such 
as hands, "a bent elbow," or a baton. R.162: 158. A ligature is the "most lethal" type of 
strangulation and "most likely to produce serious injury." R.162:158, 169-70. 
Strangulation injuries can be divided into two general categories: (1) injuries to the 
anatomical structures of the neck ( e.g., cartilages, muscles, arteries, or veins), and (2) 
injuries from lack of oxygen to the brain (e.g., brain damage, death). R.162:158-59. 
Anatomical injuries occur from "direct force being applied to the neck," and may 
occur in events "even of short duration." R.162:158-59. Damaging the cartilage in the 
neck would require a "tremendous amount of force." R.162:158, 162. Such an injury 
would not "automatically rebound" and would create "a serious situation." R.162:162. 
Injuries from lack of oxygen to the brain require less force than anatomical 
injuries, but force must be applied to the neck for "a number of minutes." R.162:159-60, 
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165-66. In movies, a person will suffer brain damage or death in a matter of seconds. 
R.162:165. That is not accurate. R.162:165. In reality, like drowning, it takes two to three 
minutes. R.162:165-66. Intoxication makes "a person's brain more fragile or susceptible 
to ... stimuli," and may cause a person to lose consciousness more easily. R.162:164. 
Both sides of the neck contain a carotid sinus. R.162: 161. If a carotid sinus is 
massaged or compressed, it will cause "a drop in blood pressure" and, if done quickly, 
will cause a person to faint. R.162:160-61. Pressure to the carotid sinus may cause a 
person to faint in 10 to 15 seconds. R.162: 161. Once the pressure is released, the person 
will "regain consciousness quickly." R.162:161-62. Holds that put pressure on the carotid 
sinus are used in sport fighting. R.162: 161. In cage fighting, for example, it is called a 
submission hold and is used to put an opponent to sleep quickly. R.162:161. 
c. The Jury Instructions on "Serious Bodily Injury." 
Before trial, the State filed notice of its intent to call an expert to testify about 
"strangulation, loss of consciousness, and the physiological effects they have on the 
human body." R.35-36. Walker also filed notice of intent to call an expert to testify "on 
matters relating to strangulation and strangulation injuries." R.81-82. In addition, the 
State proposed the following jury instruction: "You are instructed that strangulation to the 
point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury." R.65; 78. 
Walker objected to the State's proposed instruction. R.162:1-6. Walker argued that 
the State's proposed instruction would violate his constitutional rights because it would 
take the "serious bodily injury" element away from the jury. R.162: 1-6, 14-21. He argued 
that the jury should be instructed on the statutory definition of "serious bodily injury," 
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and should be permitted to decide as a matter of fact whether the alleged injury met that 
definition. R.162: 1-6, 14-21. 
The State responded that the proposed instruction was appropriate because 
strangulation to unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury as a matter of law. 
R.162:7-15. For support, the State cited State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191 n.4 (Utah 
1988), and State v. Fisher, 680 P.2d 35, 37 (Utah 1984). R.65; 78; 162:7-15. 
Following argument, the trial court agreed to give the State's proposed instruction 
because the court believed that it was "a correct statement of law": 
I believe that this is the law of the land starting with the Court of Appeals 
and then ending with the Supreme Court that has been referenced to and I 
think the second statement there is a correct statement of law, that is "You 
are further instructed that strangulation to the point of unconsciousness 
constitutes serious bodily injury" and for that reason, that one will be read. 
R.162:21. Thereafter, Walker called an expert to testify about strangulation injuries, but 
the State did not. R.162. 
At the end of trial, the trial court gave two instructions on the meaning of serious 
bodily injury. R.108-09. Instruction 17 provided the statutory definitions for "bodily 
injury" and "serious bodily injury." R.108. In relevant part, it said 
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or an impairment of 
physical condition. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death. 
R.108. Instruction 18, the State's proposed instruction, said: "You are instructed that 
strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury." R.109. 
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The court also instructed the jury on two lesser-included offenses: aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, and assault. R. 112-13. As instructed, Walker was guilty of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, ifhe "[u]sed force or means likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury." R.112. He was guilty of assault ifhe "[c]aus[ed] bodily 
injury ... or creat[ ed] a substantial risk of causing bodily injury." R.113. 
d. The Parties' Theories of the Case. 
The State's case rested on Instruction 18. In opening, the State argued that Walker 
committed aggravated assault because he "strangled" Hilton "to unconsciousness." 
R.162:69. It noted that the evidence would also show that Walker hit Hilton, but said, 
"That's not why we're here. We're not here for that punch in the face." R.162:67-68. 
Similarly, in closing, the State argued that the jury should find Walker guilty of 
aggravated assault based on the evidence that he strangled Hilton "to the point of 
unconsciousness." R.162:198. The State told the jurors that the case came down to their 
"ability to follow the law." R. 162: 192-98. The State argued that it did not matter whether 
Hilton suffered serious or lasting injuries, whether she had to go to the hospital, or what 
Dr. Rothfeder said. R.162:212-13. "Your job is to determine whether or not [Hilton] 
suffered serious bodily injury by definition of Utah law and that law, very specifically, 
and very clearly in Instruction No. 18 says you are instructed strangulation to the point of 
unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury." R.162:212-13, 218. 
The defense theme was that the incident amounted to simple assault because it did 
not cause serious bodily injury or involve force likely to cause serious bodily injury. In 
opening, defense counsel argued that "[t]he evidence [ would] not show serious bodily 
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injury"; instead, "[a]t most," it would "show a simple assault." R.162:71. Likewise, in 
closing, counsel argued that the evidence did not show that Hilton suffered serious bodily 
injury or that the chokehold was likely to cause serious bodily injury. R.162:207-11. 
e. The Jury's Deliberation and Verdict. 
The trial court excused the jury to deliberate at 4:07 p.m. R.162:220. After over an 
hour of deliberation, the jury sent out this written question: "What is the definition of 
'constitutes'? As in instruction 18." R.117; 162:220-21. 
Over defense counsel's continuing objection to Instruction 18, objection to giving 
the jury further direction on Instruction 18, and objection to the wording of the response, 
the trial court sent back this response: "Use the common and ordinary meaning of the 
word-A dictionary definition is to 'amount to' or 'add up to.'" R.117; 162 :220-24. 
After nearly an hour and a half more of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict, 
finding Walker guilty of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony. R.87-88; 162:225-26. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Instruction 18 violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because it took 
necessary elements away from the jury. Moreover, this Court should reverse because 
giving Instruction 18 to the jury was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
First, Instruction 18 violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because it 
took a necessary element away from the jury. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
guarantee defendants the right to a jury determination of guilt on every element of the 
offense. A court violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments if it instructs a jury how 
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to find on an element of the offense. Here, a necessary element of aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, was that Walker used force likely to cause serious bodily injury. The 
question whether Walker was guilty of this element was a question for the jury. The 
State's evidence that Walker used force likely to cause serious bodily injury was 
testimony that Walker put Hilton in a chokehold and Hilton briefly lost consciousness. 
Instruction 18 told the jury that the State's evidence, if believed, satisfied the force-
likely-to-cause-serious-bodily-injury element as a matter of law. Thus, Instruction 18 
violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Second, giving Instruction 18 to the jury was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt because it mandated that if the jury believed the State's evidence it had to convict 
of aggravated assault. It could not acquit or convict of simple assault. Instruction 18 told 
the jury that "strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily 
injury." A juror given this instruction would naturally understand it to mean that, as a 
matter oflaw, (1) strangulation constitutes force likely to cause serious bodily injury, and 
(2) unconsciousness caused by strangulation constitutes serious bodily injury. In other 
words, Instruction 18 told the jury that if it believed the State's evidence it had to convict 
of one of the aggravated assault options as a matter of law. Thus, Instruction 18 was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should reverse because Instruction 18 violated the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments by taking necessary elements of the 
offense away from the jury. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a jury trial on 
every element of the charged offense. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77 (2000). '"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged.""' State v. Ekstrom, 2013 UT App 271, ,I15, 316 P.3d 435; see Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 476-77. "Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to 
'a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is 
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt."' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77. 
"It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts in all 
criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the state is weak or strong, is in conflict 
or is not controverted." State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1931). Thus, a trial court is 
not permitted to "find any of the facts which are necessary elements of the crime for 
which the accused is being tried." Id. Nor is a trial court permitted to "indicate to the jury 
that some material facts, not admitted at the trial, are established beyond controversy." Id. 
As explained by our supreme court, a defendant's right to a jury trial 
extends to each and all of the facts which [had to] be found to be present to 
constitute the crime charged, and such right may not be invaded by the 
presiding judge indicating to the jury that any of such facts are established 
by the evidence. The constitutional provision may not be disregarded under 
the pretext that there is no conflict in the evidence or that the evidence will 
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permit of but one finding. When an accused enters a plea of not guilty, he 
has a right to have his entire case submitted to the jury unless he waives 
such right by expressly admitting at the trial the existence of some fact or 
facts which is or are put in issue by the plea of not guilty. These principles 
of law are so fundamental in our system of criminal procedure that we 
deem it unnecessary to cite cases and authorities in support thereof. 
Green, 6 P.2d at 181. 
Moreover, a trial court must accurately instruct the jury on the elements of the 
charged offense. "It is fundamental that the State carries the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt each element of an offense." State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221,222 (Utah 
1986); see Utah Code §76-1-501(1). "The general rule is that an accurate instruction upon 
the basic elements of an offense is essential." State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235,239 (Utah 
1985). Failure to accurately instruct the jury on the elements of an offense "constitutes 
reversible error." Id.; see State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220, ,r12, 985 P.2d 919. 
Finally, a "trial judge is not permitted to comment on evidence." State v. 
Rosenbaum, 449 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah 1969). "The court shall not comment on the 
evidence in the case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury 
that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact." Utah R.Crim.P. 19(f). 
In Green, therefore, it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that the 
defendant shot the victim, but that it was up to the jury to decide whether the shooting 
was premeditated or the result of insanity. See Green, 6 P.2d at 181. In that case, 
defendant "entered a plea of not guilty, and such plea put in issue all of the material 
allegations of the information and cast upon the state the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and all of such material allegations." Id. Thus, though defendant's 
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confession ''was properly received" into evidence, the trial court erred by instructing the 
jury that it was "not controverted" that defendant shot the alleged victim. Id. 
Likewise, it was improper for the court in Rosenbaum to instruct the jury to 
"consider [the alibi defense] with caution" because alibis are "easily fabricated and 
difficult to disprove." Rosenbaum, 449 P.2d at 1000. And it was improper for the court in 
State v. Estrada to instruct the jury that the victim "had not reached her 18th birthday" 
because the instruction "effectively withdrew from the jury consideration of one of the 
essential elements necessary to the proof and which it was their exclusive prerogative to 
consider." 227 P.2d 247, 247-48 (Utah 1951). 1 
Here, Instruction 18 violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because it 
took necessary elements away from the jury. See infra Part I.A. Moreover, this Court 
should reverse because Instruction 18 was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
infra Part I.B. 
A. Instruction 18 violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because 
it took necessary elements away from the jury. 
Instruction 18 violated Walker's right to have a jury determine guilt on every 
element of the offense because it took from the jury the questions whether Walker used 
force likely to cause serious bodily injury and whether Walker caused serious bodily 
injury. The plain language of the statute, the Utah Code as a whole, Utah case law, and 
1 See also State v. Lawrence, 234 P .2d 600, 601-04 (Utah 1951) ( court erred by 
instructing jury that the value of the stolen property exceeded $50); State v. Crank, 142 
P.2d 178, 193 (Utah 1943) (court erred by instructing jury that a conversation was 
"corroborated by the facts and circumstances as shown"); State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 
13, ,r,r9-12, 155 P.3d 909 (court erred by instructing jury that a "bicycle path was a public 
park constituting a drug-free zone"). 
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extra-jurisdictional case law all support that choking to unconsciousness is not serious 
bodily injury as a matter of law. On the contrary, whether an act of choking constitutes 
force likely to cause serious bodily injury and whether the injury caused by an act of 
choking constitutes serious bodily injury are questions for the jury. 
In Utah's Criminal Code, "[t]he Utah Legislature has ... created three 
classifications of bodily injury": bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, and serious 
bodily injury. Ekstrom, 2013 UT App 271, ,r16; see Utah Code §76-1-601(3), (11), (12). 
The classifications of bodily injury are organized into three tiers with '"bodily injury' 
constitut[ing] the lowest tier in the injury scale" and serious bodily injury constituting the 
highest. Ekstrom, 2013 UT App 271, ,rl6. 
The "different categories of injury are not subject to analysis using ordinary 
meaning." Id. "Rather, the Utah Legislature has assigned each a technical legal meaning." 
Id. "'Bodily injury' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition." Utah Code §76-1-601(3). "'Substantial bodily injury' means bodily injury, 
not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, 
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ." Id. §76-1-601(12). And '"[s]erious bodily injury' means bodily injury 
that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death." Id. 
§ 76-1-601 ( 11). 
Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly held that "it is 'within the province of the 
jury to' ... determin[ e] whether a defendant caused serious bodily injury." State v. 
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Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, iJI 8, 63 P.3d 110; see, e.g., State v. King, 604 P.2d 923, 926 
(Utah 1979); In re D.K., 2006 UT App 461, ,II 1, 153 P.3d 736; State v. Leleae, 1999 UT 
App 368, ,I20, 993 P .2d 232. Evidence that the assailant choked or beat the victim to 
unconsciousness does not change this result. See King, 604 P.2d at 926; Bloomfield, 2003 
UT App 3, ,I18; D.K., 2006 UT App 461, ,Il 1. 
In King, for instance, the evidence showed that the alleged victim "was choked 
into unconsciousness and stabbed with a pair of scissors." 604 P.2d at 926. Our supreme 
court rejected the defendant's sufficiency claim, holding that it was "within the province 
of the jury to" determine whether "defendant did cause serious bodily injury," and that 
the evidence of serious bodily injury in that case was sufficient to go to the jury. Id. at 
926. This Court reached a similar decision in Bloomfield, where the evidence showed that 
the alleged victim was so "severely beaten" that he was knocked unconscious and "did 
not regain consciousness until the following morning." 2003 UT App 3, ilill 7-18. 
Likewise, in D.K., the evidence showed that the victim was knocked to the ground, 
beaten, and "may have briefly lost consciousness." 2006 UT App 461, ,I3. As a result, the 
victim suffered bruises, a tom ear, tom tendons, possible rib fractures, recurring 
dizziness, and ongoing pain. Id. ilil4-5. This Court rejected defendant's sufficiency claim, 
holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, but noting 
that "[w]hether the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the victim]'s injuries 
are serious bodily injuries is a separate question ... left to the trier of fact." Id. ,Il 1. 
Here, Instruction 18 violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because it 
took from the jury the questions whether Walker used force likely to cause serious bodily 
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injury and whether Hilton suffered serious bodily injury. Unconsciousness is "a matter of 
degree." Ricks v. State, 446 N.E.2d 648, 650-51 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983); Flores v. State, 250 
N.W.2d 720, 723 (Wisc. 1977) (difference between bodily injury and serious bodily 
injury "is a difference in degree, not kind"), overruled on other grounds, State v. 
Richards, 365 N.W.2d 7 (Wisc. 1985). The trial evidence in this case was that 
unconsciousness after a choking incident of ten to 15 seconds, as allegedly occurred in 
this case, would not cause injury from oxygen starvation. R.162: 159-60, 165-66. Rather, 
a brief period before unconsciousness-such as ten to 15 seconds-suggests that the 
chokehold put pressure on the carotid sinus. R.162: 161-62. Chokeholds that put pressure 
on the carotid sinus are used in sport fighting because they put a person to sleep quickly. 
R.162:161-62. Such holds cause no lasting damage. R.162:161-62. As soon as the hold is 
dropped, the person regains consciousness. R.162: 161-62. Unconsciousness after such a 
brief period may also have resulted from intoxication. R.162: 164. The jury should have 
been permitted to weigh this evidence and decide whether Walker used force likely to 
cause serious bodily injury. 
The trial court relied on Fisher and Speer to support giving Instruction 18. R.65; 
78; 162:7-15, 21. As this Court noted in Bloomfield, however, those cases do not answer 
the question of whether unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury under the 
statute. See Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ,rl 8. Rather, the question of whether injuries 
constitute serious bodily injury remains a question for the jury. See King, 604 P.2d at 
926; D.K., 2006 UT App 461, if l 1; Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, if l 8; Le/eae, 1999 UT 
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App 368, ,I20. 2 The only time a court may take the question whether the defendant 
inflicted or threatened serious bodily injury away from the jury is when the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support such a finding. See In re Besendorfer, 568 P.2d 742, 743-
45 (Utah 1977) (holding evidence that alleged victim "sustained bruises and had a tooth 
capped" was insufficient to support a finding of serious bodily injury). 
In Fisher, our supreme court did not decide whether unconsciousness constitutes 
serious bodily injury as a matter of law or whether a jury may be instructed that 
unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury. See Fisher, 680 P.2d at 36-37. On the 
contrary, the court decided the narrow issue of whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct 
was prejudicial under the facts of that case. See id. 
Fisher was convicted of a variation of murder that required the State to prove 
"intent to cause serious bodily injury." Id. at 37. On appeal, our supreme court affirmed 
Fisher's claim ofprosecutorial misconduct for lack of prejudice. Fisher admitted that he 
"strangled" the victim so hard that her "neck snap[ped]." Id. at 36-37. His defense was 
that he did not intend to kill her but only to render her "unconscious." Id. Our supreme 
court concluded that there was no prejudice because Fisher admitted the elements to 
2 See also State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 238-39, 244-45 (Utah 1995) (holding evidence 
sufficient to support sentencing court's finding of substantial bodily injury where child 
was raped and sodomized, was still bleeding two hours after the assault, underwent 
surgery to repair the injuries, and remained emotionally detached two days after the 
attack); State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760, 764 (Utah 1984) (holding evidence sufficient to 
support jury finding of serious bodily injury where victim was "beaten so badly that he 
did not regain consciousness for 15 to 18 hours"); State v. Anselmo, 558 P.2d 1325, 1326-
27 (Utah 1977) (holding evidence sufficient to support jury finding of threat of serious 
bodily injury where evidence showed that defendant hit the victim with his fists, 
"severely blacken[ ed] both eyes," placed "his hands upon her throat," drew back as if to 
hit her again, and threatened to have her beaten with a hammer). 
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prove that "death result[ed] from an act 'clearly dangerous to human life' committed with 
the intent 'to cause serious bodily injury."' Id. at 37. In particular, Fisher admitted that he 
"intentionally committed an act that is dangerous to human life (strangulation), intending 
to cause serious bodily injury (protracted loss or impairment of both the heart and the 
brain, i.e., unconsciousness)." Id. 
Under the facts of that case, the Fisher court held "that strangulation constitutes 
'serious bodily injury."' Id. But, as is evident from the cases relied on in Fisher and 
subsequent Utah case law, Fisher did not hold that strangulation to unconsciousness 
constitutes serious bodily injury as a matter of law. See Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ,r18. 
The Fisher court based its holding on "the case law on this question." Fisher, 680 
P.2d at 37 & n.3. Fisher cited one Utah case, King, and three extra-jurisdictional cases-
State v. Blakeney, 408 A.2d 636 (Vt. 1979); Commonwealth v. Watson, 431 A.2d 949 
(Pa. 1981); Houck v. State, 563 P.2d 665 (Oki.Ct.App. 1977). See Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37 
& n.3. These cases underscore that Fisher did not hold that strangulation to 
unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury as a matter of law or that juries may be 
instructed that strangulation to unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury. 
As explained above, King held that the question of whether choking to 
unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury is "within the province of the jury." 
King, 604 P.2d at 926. The extra-jurisdictional cases cited by Fisher likewise recognize 
that whether choking constitutes serious bodily injury is "a question of fact for the jury." 
Blakeney, 408 A.2d at 640; see Watson, 431 A.2d at 950-53 (reversing for insufficient 
evidence to disprove self-defense where the evidence showed that defendant's belief that 
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she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm was reasonable even though 
abusive husband was unarmed because strangulation "can result in serious bodily injury, 
if not death" (emphasis added)); Houck, 563 P.2d at 668 (affirming exclusion of "self-
serving parts of defendant's declaration" because State rebutted those parts with expert 
testimony that death by strangulation would have taken "one to two minutes," which was 
"sufficient to raise an inference of premeditation"). 
Other extra-jurisdictional cases not cited in Fisher additionally recognize that 
whether choking to unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury is a question of fact 
for the jury. See, e.g., State v. Sewell, 658 A.2d 598,600 (Conn.App.Ct. 1995) ("whether 
unconsciousness constitutes serious physical injury" "is a question of fact for the jury"); 
Ricks, 446 N.E.2d at 650-51 (whether unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury is 
a question for the jury even where the statute listed "unconsciousness" as serious bodily 
injury because unconsciousness is "a matter of degree" and "[i]t remains for the 
factfinder to determine the question of degree: that the bodily injury is serious"); People 
v. Hill, 2008 WL 723853 (Mich.Ct.App. 2008) (per curiam) (reversing where trial court 
instructed the jury that rendering someone "unconscious or semi-conscious " was 
"sufficient to establish intent to do great bodily harm" because "a trial court may not give 
examples that remove an element from the jury's consideration"); State v. Ellis, 639 
S.W.2d 420, 421-23 (Mo.Ct.App. 1982) (reversing denial oflesser-included offense 
instruction because the difference between bodily injury and serious bodily injury is "a 
fine line" and should be left "to the jury"); State v. Carroll, 2014 WL 1759101, *4-*6 
(Tenn.Crim.Ct.App. 2014) (treating the question whether "victim suffered serious bodily 
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injury" as a question for the jury even where the statute listed "protracted 
unconsciousness" as serious bodily injury and the evidence showed that victim was 
unconscious for "two to three days after the attack"); Flores, 250 N.W.2d at 723, 725 
(reversing denial of lesser-included-offense instruction in case where alleged victim was 
"unconscious for more than an hour" after the attack, lost a tooth, received a cut that 
required stiches, required nine days of hospitalization, and had ongoing pain and dental 
concerns because "it was a matter of fact for the jury to determine whether the injuries 
inflicted constituted 'bodily harm' or 'great bodily harm"'); State v. Austin, 487 N. W.2d 
660, * 1 (Wis.Ct.App. 1992) (per curiam) (whether beating victim to unconsciousness 
constituted serious bodily injury was a question of fact for factfinder). 
Likewise, Utah cases issued since Fisher demonstrate that Fisher did not hold that 
strangulation constitutes serious bodily injury as a matter of law. As noted above, this 
Court, after reviewing Fisher and other Utah case law, concluded in Bloomfield that "[n]o 
Utah cases have directly addressed" whether "unconsciousness cannot constitute serious 
bodily injury under the statute." Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ,r18. Citing Fisher, 
however, this Court noted that "several" Utah cases "suggest that a jury may find that an 
assault resulting in temporary unconsciousness meets the statutory definition of serious 
bodily injury." Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ,r18 (citing State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 
(Utah 1984); State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760, 764 (Utah 1984); Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37). 
Indeed, in Peterson, our supreme court noted that strangulation to the point of 
brief unconsciousness did not constitute serious bodily injury. See State v. Boone, 820 
P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1991) (explaining Peterson, 681 P.2d at 1218-19). Peterson was 
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convicted of aggravated assault, among other charges, and appealed, arguing that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove the victim suffered serious bodily injury. See Peterson, 
681 P.2d at 1218-19. The evidence was that Peterson beat the victim "about the head and 
face," sat on her, and placed "both hands around her neck" and "strangled her" so that 
"she drifted in and out of consciousness several times." Id. at 1212. On appeal, our 
supreme court "noted that the victim 'did not suffer any serious bodily injury."' Boone, 
820 P.2d at 936 (quoting Peterson, 681 P.2d at 1218-19). Regardless, the court affirmed 
because the State did not have to prove "that death or serious bodily injury occurred." 
Peterson, 681 P.2d at 1219. Rather, as charged, the State had only to prove that "the 
assailant used 'such means of force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury,"' and 
the evidence was sufficient to support such a finding. Id. 
Though this Court did not cite Speer in Bloomfield, Speer was issued prior to 
Bloomfield and is encompassed in Bloomfield's holding that "[ n ]o Utah cases have 
directly addressed" whether unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury. 
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, iJ18. In Speer, our supreme court interpreted Fisher as 
holding "that strangulation constitutes 'serious bodily injury"' and relied on Fisher to 
affirm an unpreserved claim regarding a request for lesser-included-offense instructions. 
Speer, 750 P.2d at 191 & n.4. In Speer, defendant was charged with third degree felony 
aggravated assault, for which the State was required to prove that defendant '"used a 
deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury."' 
750 P.2d at 188. The evidence was that defendant, while carrying a loaded shotgun, 
threatened to kill his estranged wife, "grabbed her by the hair and dragged her," "threw 
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her against a washing machine," and "grabbed her by the throat and choked her" until 
"she almost passed out." Id. at 187-88, 191. On appeal, defendant argued that he should 
have received a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple assault. Id. at 188, 190. Our 
supreme court affirmed, holding that there was "no theory of the evidence that would 
have supported a verdict acquitting [defendant] of ... aggravated assault and convicting 
him of the lesser offense[]." Id. at 191. "[D]efendant admitted choking [his wife] about 
the throat until, by her testimony, she almost passed out." Id. "Thus," relying on Fisher, 
our supreme court concluded that the "uncontroverted testimony establishe[ d] that 
[defendant] used 'force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury."' Id. at 191 & n.4. 
As in Bloomfield, this Court should continue to read Speer as not deciding the 
issue of whether strangulation to unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury as a 
matter oflaw. See Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ,r18. This reading protects the defendant's 
constitutional right to due process, to a jury trial, and to present a complete defense. See 
U.S. Const. amends. VI, XN. It also follows the plain language of the Utah Code. See 
Utah Code §76-1-601(3), (11), (12). 
As stated above, Utah's Criminal Code contains "three classifications of bodily 
injury": bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, and serious bodily injury. Ekstrom, 2013 
UT App 271, ,r16; see Utah Code §76-1-601(3), (11), (12). "[T]he Utah Legislature has 
assigned each a technical legal meaning." Ekstrom, 2013 UT App 271, ,r16. Nowhere in 
those legal definitions does the term "unconsciousness" appear. See Utah Code §76-1-
601(3), (11), (12). Rather, the legal definitions describe a "three-tiered scheme," Leleae, 
1999 UT App 368, ,r18 & n.3, into which a victim's injuries must be fit. 
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The distinction between bodily injury and serious bodily injury "is a difference in 
degree, not kind." Flores, 250 N.W.2d at 723. Like other types of injuries, 
unconsciousness is "a matter of degree." See Ricks, 446 N .E.2d at 650-51. Where it fits 
into the three-tiered scheme of bodily injury, if it fits at all, is a question of fact within the 
province of the jury. See Utah Code §76-1-601(3), (11), (12). 
It is evident from the Code that the Utah Legislature intended unconsciousness, 
like all other types of injuries, to be weighed by the jury and placed on the three-tiered 
scheme of bodily injury where the jury finds it appropriately belongs. See Utah Code 
§76-1-601(3), (11), (12). 
In the civil section of the Utah Code, the Utah Legislature has provided a different 
scheme for establishing the level of bodily injury. Outside the Criminal Code, the 
legislature has divided bodily injury into just two tiers: bodily injury and serious bodily 
injury. For these sections of the Code, the legislature has assigned serious bodily injury a 
different and broader definition: "'Serious bodily injury' means bodily injury which 
involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted 
and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily 
member, organ, or mental faculty." Utah Code §§19-2-115(8)(a)(iii); 19-5-115(5)(a)(ii); 
62A-15-602(13); 73-18-13.2(1 )(b ). 
The non-criminal-code definition of serious bodily injury adopts parts of the 
criminal-code definition. For example, both definitions include "protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ" and "a substantial risk of 
death." Compare Utah Code §76-1-601(11), with Utah Code §19-2-l 15(8)(a)(iii). 
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But the non-criminal-code definition is broader than its criminal-code counterpart. 
For example, the non-criminal-code definition includes "protracted loss or impairment" 
not just "of the function of any bodily member or organ" but also of a "mental faculty." 
Compare Utah Code §76-1-601(11), with Utah Code §19-2-115(8)(a)(iii). Additionally, 
other than "risk of death," the act in the criminal code must actually "create[] or cause[]" 
the specified injury, Utah Code §76-1-601(11), whereas the non-criminal code 
encompasses acts that merely "involve[] a substantial risk" of any listed injury. See, e.g., 
Utah Code § 19-2-115(8)(a)(iii). 
The non-criminal code encompasses concepts that the criminal code relegates to 
the definitions of bodily injury or substantial bodily injury. For example, the non-
criminal-code definition of serious bodily injury includes "extreme physical pain." See, 
e.g., Utah Code §19-2-115(8)(a)(iii). By contrast, "physical pain" in the criminal code 
amounts to only bodily injury, unless it is "protracted," in which case it amounts to only 
substantial bodily injury. See Utah Code §76-1-601(3), (11), (12). 
The criminal code does not mention unconsciousness in any of the bodily injury 
definitions. See Utah Code §76-1-601(3), (11), (12). By contrast, the non-criminal code 
defines "a substantial risk of ... unconsciousness" as serious bodily injury. Utah Code 
§19-2-115(8)(a)(iii). If the Legislature intended unconsciousness to fall within a specific 
tier in the criminal code's three-tiered scheme, it would have included "unconsciousness" 
within that tier, as it has done in the civil section of the Code. Because it did not include 
"unconsciousness" within any of the three definitions of bodily injury in the criminal 
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code, the plain language of the Code supports that where unconsciousness falls on the 
three-tiered scheme is a question of fact for the jury. 
In sum, the plain language of the statute, the Code as a whole, Utah case law, and 
extra-jurisdictional case law all support that choking to unconsciousness does not 
constitute serious bodily injury as a matter of law. On the contrary, the level of injury 
caused by an act of choking is a question of fact for the jury. Thus, Instruction 18 
violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because it took necessary elements away 
from the jury. 
B. Giving Instruction 18 warrants reversal because Instruction 18 was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A violation of a defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial on every element of 
the offense is reversible error unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State 
v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ,l45, 55 P.3d 573 ("Where the error results in the deprivation of 
a constitutional right, we apply a higher standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction 
unless we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."); cf United States v. 
Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 459 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing for violation of federal right to 
unanimous jury because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Here, 
Instruction 18 violated Walker's right to a jury trial. See supra Part I.A. Thus, this Court 
should review Instruction 18 using the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 
If this Court believes that the traditional prejudice test is appropriate, this Court 
should still reverse. "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." Utah R.Crim.P. 30(a). "An error is 
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prejudicial if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or 
insufficiently or erroneously advise[s] the jury on the law." State v. Penn, 2004 UT App 
212, ,I28, 94 P.3d 308. When dealing with an erroneous jury instruction, the question is 
not whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. See State v. Lawrence, 
234 P.2d 600, 603-04 (Utah 1951). Rather, the question '"is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt."' Ekstrom, 2013 UT App 271, ,II 9. In other words, this Court will 
reverse if "it is reasonable to believe that the [ erroneous] instruction 'affected the 
outcome of [the] case."' Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ,ll3. 
Here, Instruction 18 was prejudicial because it mandated that if the jury believed 
the State's evidence it had to convict of one of the aggravated assault options; it could not 
acquit or convict of simple assault. At trial, Walker did not contest that the incident 
occurred, R.162, and the State represented that Walker was not charged with hitting 
Hilton. R.162:67-68. The question for the jury, therefore, was what level of assault, if 
any, Walker committed when he put Hilton in the chokehold. R.111-13. 
If Walker "[u]sed force or means likely to cause death or serious bodily injury" 
and "caused serious bodily injury," he was guilty of aggravated assault as charged. 
R.111; see 76-5-103(l)(b)(ii), (2)(b). If Walker "[u]sed force or means likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury" but did not "cause[] serious bodily injury," he was guilty 
of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. R.112; see 76-
5-103(1)(b)(ii); (2)(a). And if Walker "committed an act with unlawful force or violence" 
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that caused "bodily injury" or created "a substantial risk of causing bodily injury," he was 
guilty of assault. R.113; see Utah Code §76-5-102(l)(c), (2). 
The State argued that Walker was guilty of aggravated assault, a second degree 
felony. R.162:67-69, 192-98, 212-13, 218. The defense, on the other hand, argued that 
Walker was guilty of, at most, simple assault. R.162:71, 207-11. 
The State's evidence proving that Walker used force likely to cause serious bodily 
injury or caused serious bodily injury was weak. R.162. The trial evidence was that 
Walker put Hilton in a chokehold for ten to 15 seconds. R.162:79-81, 95-96, 110-11. As a 
result, Hilton briefly lost consciousness. R.162:88, 111. The responding officer noted that 
Hilton's neck had "red marks" and "appeared to be swollen." R.162: 139. But the 
paramedic examined Hilton for only ten minutes, noted "no apparent injuries," and did 
not object when Hilton declined to go to the hospital. R.162: 114, 148-49. Hilton testified 
at trial that she suffered a concussion and headaches after the incident. R.162: 127-28. But 
Hilton only went to the hospital once, ten days after the event, and the medical record 
from that visit did not mention a concussion or headaches and characterized her neck pain 
as "mild" muscle tenderness. R.162:127-28, 131-32; Defense Exh. 1. 
The State originally planned to call an expert on strangulation injuries. R.35-36. 
But after the court agreed to give Instruction 18, the State did not call such an expert. 
R.162. Instead, the State relied on Instruction 18. R.162. According to the State, the only 
question for the jury was whether it had the "ability to follow the law." R.162: 192-98. 
Indeed, the State acknowledged the weakness in its proof by arguing in rebuttal that it did 
not matter whether Hilton suffered serious or lasting injuries, whether she had to go to the 
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hospital, or what Dr. Rothfeder said. R.162:212-13. "Your job is to determine whether or 
not [Hilton] suffered serious bodily injury by definition of Utah law and that law, very 
specifically, and very clearly in Instruction No. 18 says you are instructed strangulation 
to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury." R.162:212-13, 218. 
Thus, the only expert testimony presented to the jury was Dr. Rothfeder's 
testimony for the defense. R.162. Dr. Rothfeder testified that choking for ten to 15 
seconds would not result in loss of consciousness due to oxygen starvation. R.162: 159-
60, 165-66. Rather, oxygen starvation requires two to three minutes of strangulation. 
R.162: 159-60, 165-66. Therefore, if Hilton lost consciousness after being put in a 
chokehold for just ten to 15 seconds, she must have lost consciousness for another reason. 
She may have lost consciousness because the chokehold put pressure on her carotid sinus. 
R.162: 160-62. If that was the case, the chokehold would have caused little, if any, injury. 
R.162: 160-62. Rather, as occurred here, Hilton would have regained consciousness once 
the pressure released and would have experienced minimal, if any, lingering effects. 
R.162:160-62. Indeed, this type of hold is commonly used in sport fighting. R.162:160-
62. Hilton may also have lost consciousness due to intoxication. R.162:164. According to 
Dr. Rothfeder, intoxication makes "a person's brain more fragile or susceptible to ... 
stimuli," and may cause a person to lose consciousness more easily. R.162: 164. 
It is evident from the record that the jury thought the evidence of serious bodily 
injury was weak. R.87-88; 117; 162. Instruction 18 told the jury that strangulation to 
unconsciousness constituted serious bodily injury as a matter oflaw. R.109. And the 
State argued to the jury that the question for it to decide was not a question of fact but a 
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question of its "ability to follow the law." R.162:67-69, 192-98, 212-13, 218. Regardless, 
the jury deliberated for over two-and-a-half hours, asked a question trying to clarify 
Instruction 18, and ultimately acquitted Walker of aggravated assault with serious bodily 
injury. R.117; 162:220-26. 
Though the verdict suggests that the jury believed Walker put Hilton in a 
chokehold, it also suggests that the jury did not believe Walker's behavior amounted to 
"strangulation to the point of unconsciousness" such that it "constitute[ d] serious bodily 
injury." R.87-88; 109. The jury may have believed that Walker's conduct did not 
constitute strangulation because ten to 15 seconds was insufficient time to cause oxygen 
starvation. R.162: 159-60, 165-66. Or the jury may have believed that Hilton did not lose 
consciousness at all or lost consciousness not from the chokehold but from another cause 
such as pressure on her carotid sinus or intoxication. R.162: 160-62, 164. Either way, 
Instruction 18 prejudiced Walker because it constrained the jury's ability to acquit or to 
convict of simple assault. 
Instruction 18 told the jury that "strangulation to the point of unconsciousness 
constitutes serious bodily injury." R.109. A juror given this instruction would naturally 
understand it to mean that, as a matter of law, (1) strangulation constitutes force likely to 
cause serious bodily injury, and (2) unconsciousness caused by strangulation constitutes 
serious bodily injury. R.109. In other words, if the jurors believed the State's evidence 
that Walker put Hilton in a chokehold, Instruction 18 told the jury that the chokehold 
constituted force likely to cause serious bodily injury. R.109. Likewise, if the jurors 
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believed the State's evidence that Hilton lost consciousness, Instruction 18 told the jury 
that Hilton suffered serious bodily injury. R.109. 
In short, if the jury believed the State's evidence, Instruction 18 limited the jurors' 
deliberations to offenses dealing with serious bodily injury or force likely to cause 
serious bodily injury. Those offenses were aggravated assault as charged and the lesser-
included offense of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. 
The jury could not consider acquittal or conviction for simple assault because 
those alternatives did not involve serious bodily injury or force likely to cause serious 
bodily injury. See Utah Code §76-5-102(1)(c), (2). In other words, even if the jurors 
personally believed that the chokehold was no more than an act committed with unlawful 
force or violence that caused bodily injury or created a substantial risk of bodily injury, 
they could not convict of simple assault. R.113. Likewise, even if the jurors personally 
believed that the chokehold did not cause bodily injury or create a substantial risk of 
bodily injury, they could not acquit. R. l 09. 
The fact that the court also instructed the jury on the statutory definition of serious 
bodily injury does not diminish the prejudicial impact of Instruction 18. "[J]ury 
instructions must be read and evaluated as a whole." State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, 
1104, 311 P.3d 538. "And 'if taken as a whole they fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case, the fact that one of the instructions, standing alone, is not as 
accurate as it might have been is not reversible error."' Id. 
But providing a correct instruction on the statutory definition does not cure the 
prejudice caused by an improper instruction. See Davis, 2007 UT App 13, 113. Without a 
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special verdict this Court "'cannot be sure' that the jury based its" verdict on the correct 
instruction rather than on the incorrect one. Id. In Davis, 2007 UT App 13, therefore, this 
Court reversed even though the trial court, in addition to instructing the jury that the 
bicycle path was '"a city park as defined by law,"' instructed the jury on the statutory 
definition of drug-free zones. Id. Without a special verdict, the Court could not "'be sure' 
that the jury based its drug-free zone determination on the public parking lot instruction 
and not on the erroneous bicycle path instruction." Id. Thus, "the error was prejudicial 
because it is reasonable to believe that the bicycle path instruction 'affected the outcome 
of [Davis's] case."' Id. 
Instruction 17 provided the statutory definition of serious bodily injury. R. l 08. 
Instruction 17, however, did not cure the prejudicial effect of Instruction 18. Even where 
two jury instructions are "individually correct as a matter of law," the instructions may be 
prejudicial if, when read together, they "'create[] the potential for confusion and could[] 
misle[a]d the jury."' Ekstrom, 2013 UT App 271, ,I15. Without a special verdict, it is 
reasonable to believe that Instruction 18 affected the outcome of Walker's case. 
In sum, this Court should reverse because Instruction 18 violated Walker's Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a jury trial, and giving Instruction 18 to the jury was 
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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,@ 
CONCLUSION 
Walker asks this Court to reverse and remand for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this _20 __ day ofNovember, 2015. 
! 
@ 
LORI J. SEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT· SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. 
TIMOTHY NOBLE WALKER, 
Defendant, 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
Clerk: sierras 
Prosecutor: TURNER, VICTORIA A 
DEPENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 30, 1963 
Sheriff Office#: 378775 
Audio 
Tape Number: W48 
This case involves domestic violence. 
CHARGES 
1, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Case No: 141904012 FS 
Judge: MARK KOURIS 
Date: April 6, 2015 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/24/2015 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 100 hour(s) of community service. 
SENTENCE COMMUNITY SERVICE NOTE 
Complete community service at the minimum rate of 10 hours per month beginning 2 months 
after release. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 4B month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Printed: 04/07/15 10:04:02 Pagel of 2 
nnn1~5 
Case No: 141904012 Date: 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Apr 06, 2015 
~#!f?. ~ 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
No contact with victim(s). 
Enter into and successfully complete the CATS Program. 
Comply with all standard drug and alcohol conditions imposed by probation agency. 
Obtain a substance abuse evaluation and successfully complete any recommended 
treatment. 
Obtain a domestic violence evaluation and successfully complete any recommended 
treatment. 
Obtain a mental health evaluation and successfully complete 
Serve 365 days in the Sa* Lake County jail with no credit, 
monitor. 
any recommended treatment. 
no good time, and no ankle 
Complete 180 AA classes in 180 days. 
Submit to weekly drug and alcohol tests. 
Complete an anger management course. 
Date: 4-q,-\~ 
Printed: 04/07/15 10:04:02 Paqe 2 of 2 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \~ 
You are instructed that strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious 
bodily injury. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Case No. 141904012 FS 
Plaintiff, Appellate Court Case No. 20150~ 17 
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TIMOTHY NOBLE WALKER, 
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medical testimony and that you will preclude any medical 
testimony. 
THE COURT: I don't think that's his position. I 
think that he just can't make a legal conclusion -
MR. LEAVITT: Yeah, it's just going to depend on 
what he says obviously. 
THE COURT: Right. Well, I think that both sides 
are very well taken. I think that the way the case law - and 
I re-read these cases a number of times last night trying to 
wrap my head exactly about what they're saying and I do agree 
that I believe that this is the law of the land starting with 
the Court of Appeals and then ending with the Supreme Court 
that has been referenced to and I think the second statement 
there is a correct statement of law, that is uYou are further 
instructed that strangulation to the point of unconsciousness 
constitutes serious bodily injury" and for that reason, that 
one will be read first. The first line, however, I don't 
think it is - although it is stated in the case, I'm not sure 
that's the holding. So I'm going to eliminate that part of 
it, the second part will be used. 
MR. LEAVITT: And Your Honor, the first 
instructions that I submitted, I actually submitted one 
without that first -
THE COURT: Oh, you did? 
MR. LEAVITT: - and so you should have a copy of 
21 
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§ 76-1-601. Definitions, U.C.A.1953 § 76-1-601 
Utah Code§ 76-1-601 (2012) 
U.C.A. 1953 §76-1-601 
§76-1-601. Definitions 
Currentness 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(4) ••conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or 
{ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Grievous sexual offense" means: 
(a) rape, Section 76-5-402; 
(b) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1; 
(c) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2; 
(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3; 
(e) forcible sodomy, Subsection 76-5-403(2); 
V'/2stlawNexr @ 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
§ 76-1-601. Definitions, U.C.A.1953 § 76-1-601 
(f) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; 
(g) aggravated sexual abuse ofa child, Subsection 76-5-404.1(4); 
(h) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405; 
(i) any felony attempt to commit an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) through (h); or 
(j) an offense in another state, territory, or district of the United States that, if committed in Utah, would constitute an 
offense described in Subsections (6)(a) through (i). 
(7) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(8) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(10) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control over tangible property. 
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(12) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted 
physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 
(13) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other 
method of recording information or fixing information in a fonn capable of being preserved. 
Credits 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-601; Laws 1989, c. 170, § I; Laws 1995, c. 244, § 1, eff. May I, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 1, eff. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 205, § 26, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2007, c. 339, § 2, eff. April 30, 2007. 
\,VestlawNexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
§ 76-5-102. Assault, U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-102 
(I) Assault is: 
Utah Code §76-5-102(2012) 
U.C.A. 1953 §76-5-102 
§76-5-102. Assault 
Currentness 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
Credits 
Laws 1974, c. 32, § 38; Laws 1989, c. 51, § I; Laws 1991, c. 75, § 3; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 
140, § I, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2000, c. 170, § 2, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c. 109, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
\,\.'2:-!lawNext © 20·15 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault, U.C.A.1953 § 76-5-103 
Utah Code §76-5-103 (2012) 
U.CA. 1953 §76-5-103 
§76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
Currentness 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and uses: 
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-60 l; or 
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2)(a) A violation of Subsection (1) is a third degree felony, except under Subsection (2)(b). 
(b) A violation of Subsection (1) that results in serious bodily injury is a second degree felony. 
Credits 
Laws 1973, c. 196, §76-5-103; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 10; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 2; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 5, eff. May 1, 
I 995;Laws 2010, c. 193, § 4, eff. Nov. I, 2010. 
',N2stlz_1.vNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. 1-s!o claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
United States Constitution 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
United States Constitution 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such state. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of 
the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume 
or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
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169 Wis.2d 467 
Unpublished Disposition 
See Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 809.23(3), 
regarding citation of unpublished opinions. 
Unpublished opinions issued before July 1, 2009, are 
of no precedential value and may not be cited except 
in limited instances. Unpublished opinions issued on 
or after July 1, 2009 may be cited for persuasive value. 
* 
NOTE: THIS OPINION WILL NOT APPEAR 
IN A PRINTED VOLUME. THE DISPOSITION 
WILL APPEAR IN A REPORTER TABLE. 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin. 
STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
Shannon C. AUSTIN, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 91-1616-CR. May 14, 1992. * 
Petition for Review Filed 
Appeal from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 
La Crosse county; Michael J. Rosborough, Judge. Affirmed. 
Circuit Court, La Crosse County 
AFFIRMED. 
Before EICH, C.J., DYKMAN and SUNDBY, JJ. 
Opinion 
PERCURIAM. 
* 1 Shannon Austin appeals from a judgment convicting him 
of aggravated battery and an order denying his postconviction 
motion. To convict for aggravated battery, the state must 
show that the victim suffered great bodily harm. Section 
940.19(2), Stats. Austin contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove this clement of the crime. We disagree 
and therefore affinn. 
Austin does not dispute the fact that he administered a severe 
beating to his ex-girlfriend, Valerie Burbach. According 
to the testimony, he struck her back and head with a 
small wooden bat, punched her, and smashed her head 
against the ground. Btrrbach's treating physician testified 
that she suffered a concussion and sustained the most 
severe bruising on her head that he had ever seen. Pictures 
introduced at trial show marked cuts and bruises all over 
Burbach's face, abrasions on her knees and hands, two 
severely blackened eyes, and scalp wounds. Burbach testified 
that Austin knocked her unconscious during the beating. 
Afterwards, she experienced nausea, dizziness and headaches 
for several weeks. The physician testified that the beating 
caused those symptoms. The trial court, acting as the trier of 
fact, accepted that testimony and found that Burbach's injuries 
were sufficiently serious to constitute great bodily harm. 
Great bodily harm is established if the victim suffers "serious 
bodily injury." Section 939.22(14), Stats. Serious injury has 
important or dangerous consequences and is high in degree 
as opposed to trifling. Cheatham v. State, 85 Wis.2d 112, 
123, 270 N.W.2d 194, 199 (1978). Whether the injury is 
serious enough to constitute great bodily harm is ordinarily 
a jury question. La Barge v. State, 74 Wis.2d 327, 334-35, 
246 N.W.2d 794, 797-98 (1976). We will affirm a finding 
of great bodily harm if the evidence reasonably allows it. 
Cheatham, 85 Wis.2d at 119,270 N.W.2d at 198. Because the 
line between great bodily harm and mere bodily harm is not 
easily drawn, we recognize a twilight zone within which the 
trier of fact can reasonably decide either way. Flores v. State, 
76 Wis.2d 50, 58-59, 250 N.W.2d 720, 724 (1977). 
Austin contends that Burbach did not suffer great bodily harm 
because her injuries were not permanent and because her 
medical treatment consisted of nothing besides Tylenol and 
ice. He also notes her brief hospital stay. Although these are 
mitigating factors, they do not preclude a finding of great 
bodily harm as a matter of law. The short-term effects of 
the beating were serious enough to place the issue within the 
"twilight zone" within which bodily harm and great bodily 
harm merge. We therefore deem reasonable the trial court's 
finding of great bodily harm. 
Austin initially raised the issue whether he should be 
resentenced under the newly created intensive sanction 
program, sec. 973.032, Stats. By letter dated February 10, 
1992, he concedes that he is not eligible for that program. 
By the Court.-Judgment and order affirmed. 
*2 This opinion will not be published. See Rule 809.23(1) 
(b)5, Stats. 
------------------------· ---·- . ·------ ------------· 
State v. Austin, 169 Wis.2d 467 (1992) 
487 N.W.2d 660 
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2014 WL 1759101 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
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Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 
at Knoxville. 
STATE of Tennessee 
v. 
Ronald L. CARROLL and John Boyde Collett. 
No. E2013-01781-CCA-R3-CD. 
March 25, 2014 Session. I April 30, 
2014. I Application for Permission to 
Appeal Denied by Supreme Court Oct. 15, 2014. 
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Claiborne County, 
No.2010-CR-771; E. Shayne Sexton, Judge. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
James D. Estep, III (on appeal), Tazewell, Tennessee; and 
Thomas Eikenberry (at trial}, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the 
appellant, Ronald L. Carroll. 
Mark Blakley, District Public Defender; and Matthew 
McClung (on appeal) and Robert Scott (at trial), Assistant 
District Public Defenders, Lafollette, Tennessee, for the 
appellant, John Boyde Collett. 
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy 
Wilber, Assistant Attorney General; Lori Phillips-Jones, 
District Attorney General; and Jared Effler, Assistant District 
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 
ROGER A. PAGE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, 
in which D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., and CAMILLE R. 
McMULLEN, JJ ., joined. 
OPI.L~ION 
ROGER A. PAGE, J. 
*1 Appellants Ronald L. Carroll and John Boyde Collett 1 
stand convicted of especially aggravated robbery. The trial 
------ ---------·· ·~- --
court sentenced Appellant Carroll to serve fifteen years 
as a violent offender and sentenced Appellant Collett to 
serve seventeen years as a violent offender. On appeal, the 
appellants argue that (I) the evidence was insufficient to 
support their convictions for especially aggravated robbery; 
(2) the victim's coaching of an essential witness should have 
resulted in a mistrial; and (3) the prosecutor violated the 
appellants' right to remain silent during closing arguments. 
Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial 
court. 
Several documents in the record indicate the spelling of 
Appellant Collett's name as "John Boyd"; however, it is 
the policy of this court to style the case based on the 
indictment, which in this case spells Appellant Collett's 
name as we have done. 
I. Facts 
This case concerns the June 22, 2010 especially aggravated 
robbery of the victim, Norman Alan Meyers, at his home in 
Claiborne County. At trial, Sherry Huff testified that she lived 
across the street from the victim and his wife. She recalled 
seeing two men sitting in a "two-tone color pickup" truck 
parked outside of the victim's house on June 22,2010. Later in 
the day, Mrs. Huff saw the same men walking on the victim's 
property. 
The victim's wife, Sharon Meyers, testified that both 
appellants came to her house on June 22, 2010. She and 
her eleven-year-old grandson were alone in the house. Mrs. 
Meyers said that the appellants knocked on the door, but she 
did not open the door. The appellants left but returned later in 
the day. They again knocked on the door. When she did not 
answer, they went to sit in their truck, which she described 
as "two-tone." Fifteen to twenty minutes later, the victim 
returned home. Mrs. Meyers testified that soon thereafter, 
her grandson (who had been playing outside) ran inside and 
told her, " '[T]hose men are fighting Papaw [the victim], 
and he's bleeding.' "Mrs. Meyers went outside and observed 
Appellant Carroll sitting in the driver's seat of the truck 
and Appellant Collett leaving the victim's garage carrying a 
shovel. Appellant Collett put the shovel, which Mrs. Meyers 
had never seen before, in the back of the truck, and the two 
men left. Mrs. Meyers found the victim standing in the garage. 
She testified that "his face was all bloody." Mrs. Meyers said 
that her daughter called for an ambulance and for police. The 
ambulance arrived ten minutes later. On cross-examination, 
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Mrs. Meyers testified that the victim told her that Appellant 
Collett hit him with the shovel. 
The victim testified that he saw Appellant Carroll at his house 
when he returned home from picking up his son-in-law after 
work on June 22, 2010. He talked to Appellant Carroll for 
a few minutes in his garage, and Appellant Carroll asked to 
borrow money from the victim. The victim explained that 
he had previously loaned money to Appellant Carroll, but 
on June 22, he did not have extra money to give him. They 
left the garage, and the victim "felt a thump at the back of 
[his] head."He turned around and saw Appellant Collett with 
a raised shovel. Appellant Collett hit him in the head with 
the shovel, which knocked him back into Appellant Carroll. 
The victim said he and Appellant Carroll "bumped heads." 
Appellant Carroll "put his arms around" the victim, causing 
him to be unable to move. The victim testified that Appellant 
Carroll told Appellant Collett to take the victim's wallet. He 
did so, and then the men dragged the victim into the garage. 
The victim testified that appellants threw him in the corner of 
the garage "and started stomping [him], kicking [him]." The 
victim said that he was calling for help and heard his grandson 
run into the garage. The next thing that he remembered was 
waking up at the University of Tennessee hospital "two or 
three days later." 
*2 The victim testified that his lungs collapsed as a result of 
the attack and that seven to eight staples were required to close 
the laceration on the top of his head. He also had multiple 
bruises. He missed two weeks of work. The victim further 
testified that he had $377 in the wallet taken by appellants. 
He said that he felt pain as a result of the attack and agreed 
that the pain lasted "[t]or days after." The victim stated that 
he "could[ not] hardly breathe" afterwards. As of the time of 
trial, August 2012, he still suffered from dizzy spells, which 
he did not have before the attack, and had a "pump knot" on 
his head. The victim claimed that he was not "pain free" at the 
time of trial and that he was still seeing a doctor for the pain. 
He explained that he had a hernia in his kidney and bowels. 
The victim said that he did not recover his wallet until the 
day of the preliminary hearing in this case. On that day, he 
learned that someone had thrown an item into his truck bed 
while he was inside the courthouse, and he discovered that the 
item was his wallet. The wallet was wet and muddy. 
On cross-examination, the victim denied coming home earlier 
on the day of the attack. He also denied speaking with 
Appellant Carroll by telephone that day. The victim testified 
that he had no memory of speaking with the 9-1-1 dispatcher 
after the incident. After counsel played the 9-1-1 recording 
for the jury, the victim agreed that he had spoken with the 
dispatcher. He explained that some of the things he said on the 
recording actually referred to events that happened two weeks 
prior to the incident. The victim testified that other things he 
said were not true but that he only said them because he was 
addled after being hit with a shovel. 
Captain David Honeycutt of the Claiborne County Sheriff's 
Office testified that he and Detective Anthony Veighon 
responded to an assault call at the victim's house on June 
22, 2010. From canvassing the neighborhood, he received 
infonnation about the suspects' being in an older-model truck 
and having been near a specific wood pile. He collected a beer 
can and an "alcohol swab," described as being similar to the 
cloth part of a band-aid, from the area near the wood pile. Both 
were later sent to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation's 
("TBI") crime laboratory. Captain Honeycutt testified that the 
victim's garage showed evidence of a struggle and that there 
were blood droppings on items in the garage. He said that 
law enforcement collected buccal swabs from both appellants 
after taking them into custody, which were also sent to the 
crime laboratory. Captain Honeycutt testified that Appellant 
Carroll gave a statement to him and Detective Veighon on 
June 23, 2010. Appellant Carroll told them: 
At approximately 3:30 p.m., I went to Alan's [the victim's] 
house and saw him for about 15 minutes, and Alan said 
he had to go pick up his son-in-law. I left [,] went across 
from Forge Ridge and got some drinking water and then 
went back toward J.S. Auto and called Alan once on my 
phone and had service, and Alan said, just go to my house 
and wait on me, so I went back to Alan's house and waited. 
I waited about 30 to 40 minutes[;] then Alan came home 
from picking up his son-in-law. 
*3 The son-in-law and Alan's daughter went to their 
home[,] and Alan came over. We went into his garage. At 
that time, Alan said he was missing his wallet and pills. 
Alan stated-started to get upset[,] and that was when he 
hit me on the left side of my head with a shovel, and I hit 
the ground. When I got up, I took the shovel from Alan, and 
I hit him with the shovel one time[,] and he fell. I threw the 
shovel down, and he started cussing me and went to get his 
son-in-law and told him to get a gun. At that time, I got in 
my truck, and the son-in-law came out with a baseball bat. 
And J told him, I will run over you if you come over here. 
At that time, me and John left and went straight home. 
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Captain Honeycutt testified that during the interview, he 
observed a small abrasion on Appellant Carroll's head, a 
photograph of which was entered as an exhibit. He had no 
knowledge of whether Appellant Carroll received medical 
attention. 
TBI forensic scientists testified that Appellant Carroll's DNA 
was found on the alcohol swab collected from the victim's 
property. They further testified that there was insufficient 
DNA on the beer can to create a DNA profile and that there 
were no identifiable latent fingerprints on the beer can. 
Paramedic Gregory Lynn Fultz testified that he responded 
to the victim's home on June 22, 2010. When he arrived, 
he observed the victim, who had blood on him, and another 
individual standing outside, and the individual helped the 
victim walk to the ambulance. The victim stepped inside 
the ambulance and sat down. Mr. Fultz testified that he 
tried to stop the bleeding and assessed the victim for further 
injuries. The victim had two wounds, one on top of his 
head and another on the back. Mr. Fultz said that he asked 
the victim questions to assess his mental status. The victim 
was "slow to answer questions." He knew his name but 
could not remember his birth date. Mr. Fultz agreed that in 
his assessment, the victim's injuries were serious because 
"[a] nonnal person ... should know [his] birthday."Mr. Fultz 
"detennined that [the victim] needed to go to a level one 
trauma center" because the local facilities were "not equipped 
to handle a neurologic deficit such as the memory loss."Mr. 
Fultz transported the victim to a helicopter landing zone 
in Harrogate so that a helicopter could take him to the 
University of Tennessee Hospital in Knoxville. Mr. Fultz 
testified that on the way to the landing zone, the victim "lost 
consciousness." The victim regained consciousness after Mr. 
Fultz applied a painful stimulus to his sternum, but the 
victim was still incoherent. Mr. Fultz testified that in his 
opinion, the victim's health deteriorated during the transport. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Fultz testified that the victim was 
unconscious for "[a] matter of seconds." 
The victim's grandson, R.G., 2 testified that he was eleven 
years old at the time of the trial. He said that he was at his 
grandparents' house on June 22,2010. R.G. testified that when 
the victim returned home on June 22, the victim went into the 
garage with the appellants. R.G. identified the appellants in 
the courtroom. R.G. said that he heard the victim scream, so 
he "peeked in the door[,] and they were beating on him."R.G. 
said that the victim was lying down and crying while the 
appellants were "stomping on him." R.G. went inside the 
house and told his grandmother what was happening. Then, 
he saw the appellants leave in a Dodge truck. On cross-
examination, R.G. clarified that he saw Appellant Collett 
sitting near a wood pile while he and Appellant Carroll waited 
for the victim. He did not actually see Appellant Collett go 
inside the garage when the victim and Appellant Carroll did 
because R.G. had gone behind the garage to play after that 
point. Following R.G.'s testimony, the State rested. 
2 It is the policy of this court to protect the identities of 
minor witnesses, so we will refer to this witness by his 
initials. 
*4 On behalf of Appellant Collett, both of his parents 
testified that he had been at their house between the time of 
the incident and when they drove him to the sheriffs office 
on June 24, 2010. They also testified that while they were at 
the courthouse on the day of the preliminary hearing, neither 
they nor either of the appellants ever left the building while 
the victim was also there. 
After the close of proof and deliberations, the jury found 
both appellants guilty of especially aggravated robbery. 
The trial court sentenced Appellant Carroll to serve fifteen 
years as a violent offender and Appellant Collett to serve 
seventeen years as a violent offender. The trial court denied 
the appellants' motion for new trial, and this appeal follows. 
II. Analysis 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
The appellants argue that the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain their conviction for especially aggravated robbery. 
Specifically, they contend that the victim did not suffer 
serious bodily injury. The State responds that the evidence 
was sufficient, and we agree with the State. 
The standard for appellate review of a claim challenging the 
sufficiency of the State's evidence is "whether, after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 
560 {1979) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,362, 
92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972)); seeTenn. R.App. P. 
13(e); State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn.2011). To 
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obtain relief on a claim of insufficient evidence, appellant 
must demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. This standard 
of review is identical whether the conviction is predicated 
on direct or circwnstantial evidence, or a combination of 
both.State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 {Tenn.2011); 
State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn.1977). 
On appellate review, " 'we afford the prosecution the 
strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all 
reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn 
therefrom.' " Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (quoting State 
v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 {Tenn.2010)); State v. 
Williams. 651 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn.1983); State v. 
Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 {Tenn.1978). In a jury 
trial, questions involving the credibility of witnesses and 
the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well 
as all factual disputes raised by the evidence, are resolved 
by the jury as trier of fact. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 
651,659 {Tenn.1997); State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559,561 
{Tenn.1990). This court presumes that the jury has afforded 
the State all reasonable inferences from the evidence and 
resolved all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the State; 
as such, we will not substitute our own inferences drawn 
from the evidence for those drawn by the jury, nor will 
we re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. Dorantes, 331 
S.W.3d at 379; Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835; see State 
v. Sheffield. 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 {Tenn.1984). Because a 
jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence that 
appellant enjoyed at trial and replaces it with one of guilt at 
the appellate level, the burden of proof shifts from the State to 
the convicted appellant, who must demonstrate to this court 
that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's findings. 
Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (citing State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 
60, 65 (Tenn.2011 )). 
*5 To sustain their convictions for especially aggravated 
robbery, the State had to prove that the appellants committed 
a robbery with a deadly weapon and that the victim 
suffered serious bodily injury. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-
403(a)."Robbery is the intentional or knowing theft of 
property from the person of another by violence or putting 
the person in fear."/d. § 39-13-401(a). "Serious bodily 
injury" is bodily injury that involves substantial risk of 
death, protracted unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, 
protracted or obvious disfigurement, or the protracted loss 
or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, 
organ, or mental faculty. Id. § 39-11-106(a)(34). 
.. -· ···-.. ·---------------------------
The appellants only challenge whether the victim suffered 
serious bodily injury. Therefore, we must apply the statutory 
definition of serious bodily injury to the evidence of the 
victim's injuries presented at trial. See State v. Farmer, 
380 S.W.3d 96, 101 (Tenn.2012). Viewed in the light 
most favorable to the State, there is evidence to support 
several of the section 39-ll-106(a)(34) factors for serious 
bodily injury. However, the strongest support is for the 
victim's protracted unconsciousness. "Protracted" in this 
context means "delayed or prolonged in time." State v. Derek 
Denton, No. 02C0I-9409-CR--00186, 1996 WL 432338, 
at *5 (Tenn.Crim.App. Aug.2, 1996) (citations omitted). 
Appellants argue that the victim did not experience protracted 
unconsciousness based on the testimony of the paramedic, 
who said that the victim was unconscious for "a matter of 
seconds." In support, Appellant Carroll points to this court's 
opinion in David Earl Scott, in which this court held that the 
victim's testimony that she was not unconscious for a long 
period of time did not support a conclusion that she suffered 
protracted unconsciousness. See State v. David Earl Scott, 
No. E2011-00707-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5503951, at *6 
(Tenn.Crim.App. Nov.2, 2012), penn. app. denied (Tenn. 
March 5, 2013). In contrast, the victim in this case stated 
that he awoke in the hospital two to three days after the 
attack. While the paramedic testified that the victim regained 
consciousness when a painful stimulant was applied, he also 
testified that the victim remained incoherent and that his 
condition continued to deteriorate. This is not a situation 
where the victim was restored to full consciousness after 
only a matter of seconds. This case is more like Bill Nelson 
Narrimore, in which this court held that the victim's testimony 
that he did not remember anything from the time he was hit 
in the head until he was in a helicopter en route to a hospital 
satisfied the protracted unconsciousness factor for serious 
bodily injury. State v. Bill Nelson Narrimore, No. 03C01-
9308-CR-00276, 1995 WL 10337, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. 
Jan. I I, 1995). Another similar case is Steven Shane Neblett. 
State v. Steven Shane Neblett, No. M2011-02360-CCA-R3-
CD, 2012 WL4841322 (Tenn.Crim.App. Oct.9,2012),perm. 
app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 17, 2013). In Neblett, the victim "was 
in and out of consciousness and had no memory after being 
hit until the following morning. Further, he said he suffered 
memory problems as a result of the blows."Jd. at * 11. Thus, 
we conclude that the evidence in this case established that the 
victim suffered from protracted unconsciousness. 
*6 Furthermore, there is ample additional evidence in the 
record from which the jury could find that the victim received 
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serious bodily injury. The record showed that the victim was 
hit in the head twice with a shovel and was kicked in the 
torso multiple times. The victim's head injury caused him to 
suffer some mental impairment, as shown by his being unable 
to remember his birth date when the paramedic assessed 
his condition and his responses to the 9-1-1 dispatcher. 
Moreover, the paramedic believed the victim's injuries to be 
severe enough to justify flying him to a trauma center. The 
laceration on top of the victim's head required seven to eight 
staples, and he said that he still had a "pump knot" on his head, 
two years later. The victim also testified that he suffered from 
collapsed lungs and damage to his kidneys and bowels as a 
result of the kicking. He said that he suffered from dizzy spells 
and that he was still being treated for pain at the time of trial. 
He could not return to work for two weeks after the attack. 
Therefore, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for 
the jury to have found that the victim suffered a serious bodily 
injury. Accordingly, the appellants are without relief as to this 
issue. 
B. Violation of Witness Sequestration Rule 
The appellants contend that the victim impermissibly coached 
his grandson, R.G., to testify that the appellants kicked 
him and stomped on him. The appellants raised this issue 
in their motion for new trial and attached affidavits from 
Appellant Collett's parents attesting that they witnessed the 
coaching. However, the trial court's order denying the motion 
for new trial does not address the sequestration issue, and 
the appellants have failed to include the transcript of the 
motion for new trial hearing in the appellate record. It is the 
duty of the appellant to prepare a record which conveys "a 
fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with 
respect to the issues which form the basis of the appeal" 
and will enable the appellate court to determine the issues. 
Tenn. R.App. P. 24(a). Without the hearing transcript, the 
record is not sufficient for this court to review the issue. 3 The 
appellants have therefore waived this issue. 
3 We recognize that affidavits attached to motions for new 
trial are to be considered evidence by the trial court. 
SeeTenn. R.Crim. P. 33(c). However, the trial court 
is also free to consider the affidavits "incredible" and 
to order an evidentiary hearing on the issue. SeeTenn. 
R.Crim. P. 33, Advisory Comm'n Cmt In this situation, 
we conclude that it would be inappropriate for this court 
to rely on the affidavits as evidence on appeal of what 
occurred in the trial court. 
C. Comment on Appellant Carroll's Right Not to Testify 
Both appellants contend that the State improperly commented 
on Appellant Carroll's right not to testify during its closing 
rebuttal argument. The State responds that the comments 
made were not error and that if this court determined that the 
comments were made in error, then the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Both the federal and state constitutions protect a defendant's 
right to remain silent. SeeU.S. Const. Amend. 5; Tenn. Const. 
Art. 1, § 9. "It is never proper for a prosecuting attorney 
to comment upon a defendant's decision not to testify."State 
v. Thornton, 10 S.W.3d 229, 235 {Tenn.Crim.App.1999) 
(citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 
L.Ed.2d 106 {1965)). Such comments constitute reversible 
error unless this court concludes that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.State v. Hale, 672 S.W.2d 201, 
202-03 {Tenn.1984). This court must consider five factors to 
determine whether the comments had a prejudicial effect on 
the verdict, requiring reversal: 
*7 "( 1) the conduct complained of in light of the facts and 
circumstances of the case; 
{2) the curative measures undertaken; 
(3) the intent of the prosecutor in making the improper 
remarks; 
(4) the cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any 
other errors in the record; 
(5) the relative strength or weakness of the case." 
Thornton, 10 S.W.3d at 235 (quoting Judge v. State, 539 
S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn.Crim.App.1976)). 
The record shows that the trial court instructed the jury prior 
to closing arguments about the appellants' right not to testify 
and that their not testifying could not be held against them. 
The State made no mention in its initial closing argument 
about the appellants' not testifying. In Appellant Carroll's 
closing arguments, defense counsel questioned whether the 
State introduced DNA evidence to cover up a weak case. In 
rebuttal, the prosecutor addressed the purpose of the forensic 
evidence, and the following exchange occurred: 
State: We introduced the DNA evidence because we never 
know what the defendants are going to say at trial. Now, 
--------·------------ -------- -----· -------·-------·· - - . . ........ --- ---------------------------
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Mr. Carroll chose not to testify [,] which is his absolute 
right. 
Defense: Objection, your Honor. 
Trial Court: Continue. Ladies and gentlemen, as long as it's 
a proper statement of the law-of course, the defendant 
is not required-neither defendant is required to testify. 
Go ahead. 
State: Mr. Carroll's right to not testify is his absolute right, 
and you cannot hold his silence against him. And nobody 
knows if he's going to testify until the trial comes to that 
point. 
The record is clear that the prosecutor commented on the 
appellants' right to remain silent. However, the application of 
the Judge factors leads us to conclude that the prosecutor's 
comments do not require reversal. In context, the prosecutor 
their silence. In addition, the jury was thoroughly instructed 
on the appellants' right not to testify and on the State's 
burden of proof. Moreover, the case against the appellants 
was particularly strong, and there were no other instances of 
arguably improper conduct that would compound the effect 
of this one. Therefore, we conclude that the comments did 
not have a prejudicial effect on the verdict and were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Thornton, 10 S.W.3d at 235. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on our review of the record, the applicable law, and 
the arguments of the parties, we affinn the judgments of the 
trial court. 
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